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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Tanya A. Vargas appeals from the district court’s appellate opinion
affirming the judgment entered upon the jury verdict finding Vargas guilty of
misdemeanor eluding a police officer. On appeal, Vargas argues the district
court erred in affirming the magistrate’s denial of Vargas’ motion in limine, which
sought to suppress the investigating officer’s out-of-court and in-court
identifications of Vargas on the alleged basis that the out-of-court identification
procedure employed by the officer was impermissibly suggestive.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
At approximately 10:50 p.m. on May 8, 2015, Boise City Police Officer
Natalie Wing was on patrol in a marked police car when she observed a blue
Mazda with “a non-functioning taillight” travelling in front of her. (3/15/16 Tr.,
p.24, L.18 – p.27, L.15, p.41, L.19 – p.42, L.13.) Officer Wing followed the
Mazda and called the license plate number of the vehicle into dispatch. (3/15/16
Tr., p.27, Ls.20-25, p.29, L.8 – p.30, L.1.) The registration information returned
to “an individual out of Ogden, Utah.” (3/15/16 Tr., p.37, Ls.15-18; see also
3/15/16 Tr., p.29, Ls.8-16.) After choosing a safe location to conduct a traffic
stop, Officer Wing activated the “red and blue lights” on her patrol car. (3/15/16
Tr., p.28, L.17 – p.30, L.3.) In response, the driver of the Mazda slowed down
and “pull[ed] almost to the curb” but did not stop. (3/15/16 Tr., p.30, Ls.3-14.)
Officer Wing “turn[ed] on [her] siren to get the driver’s attention,” at which point
the driver of the Mazda “accelerated rapidly” and sped away. (3/15/16 Tr., p.30,
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Ls.5-14.)

In accordance with police department policy, Officer Wing

discontinued the pursuit so as not to endanger the general public. (3/15/16 Tr.,
p.35, L.19 – p.36, L.16.)
From the time Officer Wing began following the Mazda to the time the
driver of the Mazda sped way, approximately two minutes had elapsed. (3/15/16
Tr., p.40, L.3 – p.41, L.3.) During that time, the driver of the Mazda “made
multiple glances … toward the side driver’s mirror and then back toward the
road.” (3/15/16 Tr., p.31, L.16 – p.32, L.10, p.45, Ls.12-20.) Although it was
dark outside, the area in which the officer and the Mazda were travelling was
illuminated intermittently by street lights, and Officer Wing was able to get a good
look at the driver of the Mazda as the driver looked in her driver’s side mirror.
(3/15/16 Tr., p.32, L.19 – p.33, L.3, p.41, Ls.4-18, p.45, Ls.12-23.) In fact, while
in a well-lit intersection, the driver of the Mazda made “almost a full turn toward
that mirror,” allowing the officer to see the driver’s entire face and her profile.
(3/15/16 Tr., p.32, L.19 – p.33, L.3.) Based on her observations, Officer Wing
believed the driver of the Mazda was “a female of Hispanic nationality,” in her
“mid to upper 30’s.” (3/15/16 Tr., p.33, Ls.4-12, p.45, L.24 – p.46, L.6.)
After she discontinued the pursuit, Officer Wing contacted dispatch to
conduct a further investigation into the registered owner of the Mazda. (3/15/16
Tr., p.37, Ls.11-25.) That investigation ultimately led Officer Wing to the name,
Tanya Vargas. (3/15/16 Tr., p.38, Ls.1-10.) Officer Wing pulled up Vargas’ state
issued identification card and determined from the photograph on that card that
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Vargas was the individual she had seen driving the Mazda. (3/15/16 Tr., p.38,
L.9 – p.39, L.12.)
The state charged Vargas with misdemeanor eluding a police officer. (R.,
pp.8-9.) Before trial, Vargas filed a motion in limine seeking to suppress Officer
Wing’s “out of court, and expected in-court, identification[s]” of her, arguing the
out-of-court identification was the product of an impermissibly suggestive “single
photograph lineup” and that any in-court identification would be “irreconcilably
taint[ed].” (R., pp.41-48.) After a hearing, the magistrate denied the motion.
(3/15/16 Tr., p.11, L.8 – p.20, L.8.)

The magistrate questioned whether the

officer’s act of looking at Vargas’ identification card photograph constituted “a
lineup in the sense that the cases identify” but ruled that, “even so,” under the
facts of this case, the reliability of the identifications would be an issue for the
jury. (3/15/16 Tr., p.15, L.11 – p.19, L.10.)
At the trial that followed, the parties agreed that the only issue before the
jury was the identification of the driver who eluded Officer Wing. (3/15/16 Tr.,
p.21, L.10 – p.22, L.19, p.22, L.25 – p.24, L.2.) Officer Wing testified to having
identified Vargas from her state issued identification card photograph on the
night of the charged incident. (3/15/16 Tr., p.37, L.11 – p.39, L.18.) The officer
also made an in-court identification of Vargas. (3/15/16 Tr., p.37, Ls.1-10.) At
the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Vargas guilty of misdemeanor eluding.
(R., p.81; 3/15/16 Tr., p.68, L.16 – p.69, L.9.)
Vargas timely appealed from the judgment (R., pp.82-86) and, on appeal,
challenged the denial of her motion in limine (R., pp.113-26, 140-51; 11/17/16
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Tr., p.6, L.14 – p.12, L.8, p.21, L.8 – p.28, L.13). The district court affirmed (R.,
pp.154-63), holding that Vargas failed to show Officer Wing’s identification of her
“by viewing her driver’s license [sic] photo … was the result of improper (‘tainted’)
state conduct” (R., p.160). Specifically, the court reasoned:
One may have serious concerns about the reliability of the
identification, but the process leading to the identification is not
violative of due process. Had the officer presented a single photo
lineup to an independent witness due process concerns would
certainly be apparent. But those concerns are not apparent when
the officer is the investigator attempting to locate and identify the
offender.
(R., pp.160-61.)

The district court also held “[t]he magistrate did not violate

[Vargas’] due process rights in allowing the officer’s in-court identification,” again
reasoning, “[r]eliability concerns exist but they are not the product of improper
police conduct.” (R., p.161.)
Vargas timely appealed from the district court’s intermediate appellate
opinion. (R., pp.164-68.)

4

ISSUE
Vargas states the issue on appeal as:
1.
Did the Appellate Opinion err in affirming the trial court’s
denial of Ms. Vargas’s motion in limine seeking suppression of
Officer Wing’s identification of her, both in and out of court?
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Vargas failed to show that the district court erred in affirming the
magistrate’s denial of Vargas’ motion in limine seeking suppression of the
investigating officer’s identifications of her because, contrary to Vargas’
assertions, the investigative methods employed by the officer to confirm for
herself that Vargas was the individual who eluded her did not implicate, much
less violate, Vargas’ due process rights?
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ARGUMENT
Vargas Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Affirming The
Magistrate’s Denial Of Her Motion In Limine Seeking Suppression Of The
Investigating Officer’s Identifications Of Her
A.

Introduction
Vargas argues the district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s denial

of her motion in limine seeking suppression of Officer Wing’s identifications of
her. As she did below, Vargas characterizes Officer’s Wing’s use of Vargas’
driver’s license photo to identify her as a “single photo lineup” which, she
contends, is “inherently suspicious and impermissibly suggestive as a matter of
law.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-13.)

She also argues “[t]he out of court

identification was so suggestive as to be useless, and it irreconcilably taint[ed]”
Officer Wing’s in-court identification.

(Appellant’s brief, p.14.)

Vargas’

arguments fail. Application of the law to the facts supports the lower courts’
conclusions that the investigative methods the officer employed to confirm
Vargas’ identity were not impermissibly suggestive and did not implicate, much
less violate, Vargas’ due process rights. Vargas has failed to show any basis for
reversal of the district court’s appellate decision affirming the denial of her
motion in limine.
B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s
decision.” State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
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appellate court “examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact
and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.” Id.
“If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s]
the district court’s decision as a matter of procedure.”

Id. (citing Losser,

145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137
(1981)).
“Due process issues are generally questions of law,” over which the
appellate court exercises free review. Kootenai Medical Center ex rel. Teresa K.
v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 872, 216 P.3d 630 (2009)
(citations and quotations omitted).
C.

The Investigative Methods Employed By The Officer To Confirm For
Herself Vargas’ Identity Did Not Implicate, Much Less Violate, Vargas’
Due Process Rights
“‘Due process requires the exclusion of identification evidence if police

suggestiveness created a substantial risk of mistaken identification, except
where the reliability of the identification is sufficient to outweigh the corrupting
effect of the suggestive identification.’” Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho 713,
___, 390 P.3d 439, 444 (2017) (quoting State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 892,
980 P.2d 552, 556 (1999)); accord State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 562, 199 P.3d
123, 137 (2008). “[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of
identification testimony.” Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977), quoted
in Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at ___, 390 P.3d at 444; State v. Hoisington,
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104 Idaho 153, 161, 657 P.2d 17, 25 (1983). Thus, in cases where police action
has created a risk of misidentification, Idaho’s appellate courts apply a two-step
test “[t]o determine whether evidence of an out-of-court identification violates due
process.”

State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 593, 301 P.3d 242, 251 (2013)

(citing Hoisington, 104 Idaho at 162, 657 P.2d at 26). “First, the defendant must
establish that the identification procedure was overly suggestive.”

Almaraz,

154 Idaho at 593, 301 P.3d at 251 (citations omitted). “Second, if the defendant
meets that burden, courts consider whether the identification was nonetheless
reliable under the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citations omitted). “For an
out-of-court identification to taint an in-court identification, the out-of-court
identification must have been ‘so suggestive that there is a very substantial
likelihood of misidentification.’”

Payne, 146 Idaho at 562, 199 P.3d at 137

(quoting Trevino, 132 Idaho at 892, 980 P.2d at 556).
Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Idaho Supreme
Court have recognized the fallibility of eyewitness identifications.

See, e.g.,

Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 245 (2012); Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 10914; Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 593, 301 P.3d at 251. However, both Courts have
also recognized that, absent “improper police conduct,” the “due process check
for reliability” does not “come[] into play.” Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S.
228, 241 (2012); see also Payne, 146 Idaho at 562, 199 P.3d at 137 (where
there was “no state action and no police suggestiveness creating a risk of
misidentification” the witness’ identification was “insulate[d] … from Payne’s
arguments about the suggestiveness of the single photo lineup”).
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As explained

by the United States Supreme Court in Perry, “[a] primary aim of excluding
identification evidence obtained under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances
… is to deter law enforcement use of improper lineups, showups, and photo
arrays in the first place.” Perry, 565 U.S. at 241 (citing Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at
112). “When no improper law enforcement activity is involved … it suffices to
test reliability through the rights and opportunities generally designed for that
purpose, notably, the presence of counsel at postindictment lineups, vigorous
cross-examination, protective rules of evidence,” and the giving of appropriate
jury instructions. Id. at 233. In other words, “the Due Process Clause does not
require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness
identification when the identification was not procured under unnecessarily
suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement.” Id. at 248. Rather, in
such circumstances “the evidence (if admissible in all other respects) should be
submitted to the jury.” Id. at 239 (footnote omitted).
Application of the foregoing principles to the facts of this case supports
the district court’s conclusions that Officer Wing’s use of Vargas’ identification
card photograph to confirm Vargas’ identity did not implicate Vargas’ due
process rights and that the reliability of the identifications was an issue for the
jury. (See R., pp.155-61.) Although Officer Wing is herself a law enforcement
officer, her identification of Vargas was not the result of any improper or
unnecessarily suggestive police activity. Rather, after the driver of the Mazda
eluded her, Officer Wing conducted an independent investigation regarding the
ownership of the vehicle and, in that process, she received Vargas’ name.
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Following up on that lead, the officer pulled up Vargas’ state issued identification
card and confirmed for herself that Vargas was the individual she had seen
driving the Mazda. Because Officer Wing’s identification of Vargas occurred as
a result of her own observations and investigation, and was not “procured under
unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement,” Perry,
565 U.S. at 248, the “due process check for reliability” of the identification did not
“come[] into play,” Id. at 241. See also Payne, 146 Idaho at 562, 199 P.3d at
137.
The reasoning of State v. Hooks, 752 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008),
relied on by the district court (see R., pp.157-59), is instructive. “Hooks sold
cocaine from his car to an undercover police officer who later identified Hooks as
the seller by obtaining and viewing Hooks’s driver’s license photograph from the
Department of Motor Vehicles electronic database.” Hooks, 752 N.W.2d at 82.
In the prosecution that ensued, Hooks moved to suppress the officer’s
identification of him “on the theory that it resulted from an unfairly suggestive,
one-person photographic lineup.” Id. at 83. The district court denied the motion,
and the Minnesota Court of Appeals later affirmed. Id. at 83-85.
Citing United States Supreme Court precedent, the Hooks Court
explained that “[t]he reason a due process issue arises when a pretrial
identification procedure is unnecessarily suggestive in the typical circumstance is
that the defendant was unfairly singled out by police for the witness to identify.”
Id. at 84 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1968); Foster
v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969)). The “traditional” two-part test that examines

10

“whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive and, if so,
whether the identification is nonetheless reliable” is “designed to measure
whether police influence rather than the witness’s own reasoning and
recollection led to the witness’s identification of the defendant.” Id. (emphasis
original, citations omitted). Where, as in Hooks’ case, “the facts include[d] no
conceivable identification-inducing interaction between police and the identifying
witness,” the “constitutional concern about police-induced identification is not
present.” Id.
In rejecting Hooks’ challenge to the identification procedure employed in
his case, the Hooks Court explained in detail the reasons “why single-person
lineups trigger a constitutional concern.” Id. (emphasis original). Because the
police solve crimes and are perceived by the public to be especially credible,
witnesses place confidence in them and are easily influenced by any suggestion
that the police have narrowed their own identification of a suspect to one (or very
few) individual(s). Id. at 84-85. Recognizing these concerns, the Hooks Court
held that “an investigating officer who obtains and observes for himself a driver’s
license photograph to identify for himself the person he observed committing the
investigated crime does not implicate that person’s due process rights.” Id. at 85
(emphasis original). Specifically regarding the identification at issue in Hooks’
case, the Court reasoned:
Unlike the eyewitness to whom a single police-supplied photograph
might suggest the photographed person’s guilt, Officer Urbanski
could not have been unduly influenced by his own identification
procedure. Acting as the investigating officer, Urbanski decided for
himself which photograph to view to confirm his reasoning that the
licensed driver of the car that officers stopped leaving the scene of
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the crime was the offending drug dealer. The lineup options
therefore narrowed to a single photograph based on Urbanski’s
own reasoning, not based on the influence of an authority whose
narrowing would tend to suggest a particular suspect to a witness.
Id.

Having concluded that the investigative process used by the officer to

confirm Hooks’ identity did “not raise any fairness concerns that require[d]
application of [the traditional] two-part test” to determine the reliability of an
eyewitness identification obtained as a result of improper police conduct, the
Hooks Court affirmed the district court’s order denying Hooks’ motion to
suppress the identification evidence. Id.
The reasoning and result of Hooks apply with equal force in this case.
Like the officer in Hooks, Officer Wing “obtained and observed for [herself]”
Vargas’ state issued identification card photograph in order to “identify for
[herself] the person [she] observed committing the investigated crime.” Hooks,
752 N.W.2d at 85. Also like the officer in Hooks, Officer Wing “could not have
been unduly influenced by [her] own identification procedure.” Id. This is not a
case in which an officer supplied an identifying witness with a single photograph,
thereby potentially suggesting to the witness the photographed person’s guilt.
Rather, like the officer in Hooks, Officer Wing “decided for [herself] which
photograph to view” to confirm Vargas’ identity, thereby narrowing the “lineup
options … to a single photograph based on [Officer Wing’s] own reasoning, not
based on the influence of an authority whose narrowing would tend to suggest a
particular suspect to a witness.” Id. Because, as in Hooks, the facts of this case
“include no conceivable identification-inducing interaction between police and the
identifying witness,” the identification procedure did not even implicate, much
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less violate, Vargas’ due process rights. Id. at 84-85. The district court therefore
correctly affirmed the magistrate’s order denying Vargas’ motion in limine to
exclude the officer’s identification testimony at trial.
On appeal, Vargas recognizes the rationale of Hooks, but he urges this
Court to reject it, contending it “directly contravene[es]” the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, and “serves to
inoculate all identifications made by law enforcement from ever reaching the
second step of scrutiny under the Manson reliability factors.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp.6-11.) Vargas’ reliance on Brathwaite for the proposition that an analysis of
the reliability factors articulated in that case is required in every case where a law
enforcement officer uses a single photograph to identify a suspect because such
an identification procedure is inherently suggestive finds no support in either the
law or the facts of that case.
In Brathwaite, an undercover police officer purchased heroin from an
individual whose identity he did not know. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 99-101. Upon
returning to police headquarters, the undercover officer gave a second officer a
physical description of the seller. Id. at 101. Suspecting from the description
that Brathwaite might be the seller, the second officer obtained a photograph of
Brathwaite and left it in the undercover officer’s office.

Id.

The undercover

officer viewed the photograph two days later and identified the person in the
photograph as the individual from whom he had purchased narcotics. Id.
The issue before the Supreme Court in Brathwaite was “whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels the exclusion, in a state
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criminal trial, apart from any consideration of reliability of pretrial identification
evidence obtained by a police procedure that was both suggestive and
unnecessary.” Id. at 99. The Court ultimately answered that question in the
negative, holding that where an identification is obtained by unnecessarily
suggestive police procedures, the identification evidence may nevertheless be
admissible if certain factors – including “the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of
his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the
confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation” – outweigh
“the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.”

Id. at 109-14.

Because the petitioner in Brathwaite “acknowledged that the procedure in [that]
case was suggestive (because only one photograph was used) and
unnecessary,” id. at 109, the Brathwaite Court weighed the “corrupting effect of
the suggestive identification” against the reliability factors and ultimately
concluded the identification was sufficiently reliable to go to the jury, id. at 11417.
Contrary to Vargas’ assertions, neither the facts nor the holding of
Brathwaite mandate a conclusion that all police identifications that result from the
viewing of a single photograph are impermissibly suggestive and require an
analysis of the reliability factors set forth in that case. The undercover officer in
Brathwaite identified Brathwaite as the perpetrator of the crime, not as a result of
his own investigation, but based on a single photograph supplied to him by a
second officer who, based on the description provided to him, had formed his
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own suspicion that Brathwaite was the suspect.

While the Brathwaite Court

treated that identification procedure as unnecessarily suggestive and, therefore,
requiring consideration of the reliability factors, nothing in the Brathwaite opinion
suggests that an identification made by a police officer viewing a photograph he
or she has obtained for him or herself while investigating a crime is in any way
suggestive or improper.
Notably, in arguing that Brathwaite requires an analysis of the due
process reliability factors under the facts of this case, Vargas utterly ignores the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Perry v. New Hampshire, supra, which, as noted
above, explicitly held that “the Due Process Clause does not require a
preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when
the

identification

was

not

procured

under

unnecessarily

suggestive

circumstances arranged by law enforcement.” Perry, 565 U.S. at 248; see also
Payne, 146 Idaho at 562, 199 P.3d at 137 (witness’ identification was insulated
from due process challenge where there was “no state action and no police
suggestiveness creating a risk of misidentification”). In reaching that holding, the
Perry Court rejected “Perry’s contention that improper police action was not
essential to the reliability check Brathwaite required,” noting that deterring law
enforcement from using “improper lineups, showups, and photo arrays in the first
place” was “a key premise of the Brathwaite decision.” Perry, 565 U.S. at 241.
Where, as in this case, the identification was not arranged by law enforcement
but was instead the product of the officer’s independent investigation, “[t]his
deterrence rationale is inapposite.” Id. at 242. See also Hooks, 752 N.W.2d at
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84-85; Terry v. State, 857 N.E.2d 396, 409 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“[W]hen a police
officer who is both an investigator and a witness views a single photograph in
order to verify a suspect’s identity, the identification procedure is not unduly
suggestive.” (citation omitted)); Miles v. State, 764 N.E.2d 237, 240 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002) (“[W]here, as here, the police officer is both the investigator and the
witness, police misconduct is not at issue.”); State v. Manna, 539 A.2d 284, 312
(N.H. 1988) (police misconduct was not at issue where investigating officer
identified suspect by obtaining and viewing a single photograph because the
officer “could not be found through the photo identification process to have
impermissibly suggested to himself the person whom he arrested” (emphasis
original)).
Because the procedure Officer Wing used to identify Vargas was not the
result of any police suggestiveness creating a risk of misidentification, the district
court correctly concluded the identification did not implicate, much less violate,
Vargas’ due process rights. (R., pp.160-61.) As such, any questions regarding
the reliability of the identification were for the jury to resolve.

See Perry,

565 U.S. at 245 (“The fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint
of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial court to
screen such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to assess its
creditworthiness.”). Vargas has failed to show the district court erred in affirming
the magistrate’s order denying her motion in limine to exclude Officer Wing’s outof-court and in-court identifications.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
appellate decision affirming Vargas’ conviction for misdemeanor eluding a police
officer.
DATED this 15th day of August, 2017.
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